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How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores “track-change diplomacy,” that is, how diplo-
mats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as word processing software and mobile devices to collabora-
tively edit and negotiate documents. To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the
article adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the way a tool or technology
simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords
shareability, visualization, and immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international nego-
tiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct and promote national interests; how
diplomats reach compromises among a large number of states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power
plays out in international negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of negotiations
between the European Union’s member states, as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts new light on these negotiations,
where documents become the site of both semantic and political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise
of keeping track and reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact lead to
a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy.
Introduction
We appreciate the hard work you have done on this
file. We are ready to lift our reservations on the text.
As regards the outstanding issue, I have a very strange
instruction [laughter around the table], but the com-
promise just proposed by Tom can be a way forward.
(Ambassador at Coreper 1 February 18, 2015; Nielsen
2015)
This is how a national ambassador explains his coun-
try’s position in the European Union. What is said may
initially appear trivial (the laughter occurred because
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everyone around the table recognized that the ambassador
felt a need to signal a subtle difference between the out-
come and the instructions he had received from his capital),
but it demonstrates how diplomats promote national inter-
ests during international negotiations. The ambassador in
the quote above refers to his colleagues’ preparations prior
to the meeting in terms of editing the document—a Word
file—which has led to a draft text they are willing to ac-
cept. It serves as the perfect example of contemporary mul-
tilateral negotiations. These days, multiple authors, based
in multiple locations, find compromises using collabora-
tive text-drafting software, email, and mobile devices. The
track-change function in word processing software should,
in principle, make text changes and revisions more visible
during negotiations than would otherwise be the case. Yet,
in actuality, the opposite happens. As we shall see, when
hundreds of people negotiate on a document at high speed,
track-changes can be an instrument of (at times intentional)
opacity, rather than transparency, and diplomats can lose
control. How can we explain this phenomenon?
In this article, we provide an explanation and add to in-
ternational relations theory by unpacking how the concept
of affordances links practices and technology. We focus on
diplomacy where the effects of technology have received
little attention (but see Bátora 2008; Cooper, Heine, and
Thakur 2013; Bjola and Holmes 2015; Hocking and Melis-
sen 2015; Branch 2017; Duncombe 2017). Innovations in
communication technology from the telegraph to the email
have not just accelerated international negotiations; each
technological innovation has helped determine what kind
of diplomacy can take place. Today, international negotia-
tions are largely a digitally mediated struggle for semantic
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control over documents. Yet our theories of international
relations have so far largely failed to take the changes in
international negotiations attributable to technology into
account. One reason is that our understandings of negoti-
ations still revolve around the notion of diplomats acting
as mediators (Der Derian 1987; Sharp 2009; Constantinou
2013), whereas ICT has removed many barriers of space and
time. Another reason is that it is difficult to gain access to the
negotiation table unless you are one of the negotiating par-
ties. For this reason, scholars discover certain phenomena
only incidentally.
That is exactly what happened to us in the rounds of
participant observation we conducted in the diplomatic
engine room of the European Union, the Council of Min-
isters. Diplomatic use of email, mobile devices, and word
processing software features—for example, track-changes,
tables, or bold text—may seem inconsequential. However,
it significantly affects national positions and the sorts of
international compromises that states can reach. It is in
the documents’ changes, rejections, and acceptances that
negotiators enact the politics of international relations.
For this reason, “track-change diplomacy” deserves the
undivided attention of international relations scholars. By
coining the term track-change diplomacy, we do not claim to
have discovered a radically new process unique to the digital
age. Diplomacy has—for a long time—involved collective
text drafting (although we have never known much about
the process itself). However, as this article will demonstrate,
ICT changes international negotiations in significant ways.
We use the term track-change diplomacy as a heuristic to ana-
lyze how ICT (including, but not limited to the track-change
function in word processing software) shapes diplomatic ne-
gotiations. We will focus on three main affordances of this
technology: shareability, visualization, and immediacy. Affor-
dances are the inherent action potentials of a given technol-
ogy, which its users do not always realize. We argue that the
specific technology used to reach diplomatic compromises
fundamentally informs how drafting and negotiating pro-
ceed. Shareability allows for multiple coauthors to work on a
document, while visualization means these authors operate
within a particular schematized design aesthetic, and the im-
mediacy of high-speed text circulation facilitates back-and-
forth editing under continuous time pressure. In large mul-
tilateral settings that negotiate on a continuous basis, these
three characteristics collectively shape key international re-
lations categories: negotiators define the national interest as
textual edits, they reach compromises through aesthetically
circumscribed drafting exercises, and power is emergent as
the individual negotiator experiences a loss of agency when
the text gains a life of its own. In some instances, when diplo-
mats deal with nonvital national interests, the characteris-
tics of track-change diplomacy can result in diplomats los-
ing control over the negotiation process and even adopting
legislation that none of the negotiating parties intended.
We have divided this article into five parts. The first
section unfolds how scholars have analyzed international
negotiations and the production of texts in diplomacy to
date—focusing on cables, reports, and speeches—rather
than internationally negotiated texts. The second section
outlines how international relations scholarship has drawn
on Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Actor–
Network theory (ANT), but still lacks a language to prop-
erly unpack how diplomats use technology in practice. The
third section develops the concept of technological affor-
dance as something that both enables and constrains the
tasks that users can possibly perform. The fourth section
presents our ethnography, integrating participant observa-
tion, confidential documents, and interviews. In the final
section, we demonstrate the value of our affordance ap-
proach to technology through an in-depth analysis of every-
day negotiations in the European Union. We conclude by
outlining a research agenda on technology in practice, en-
abling international relations theory to better address how
technologies, from artificial intelligence to social media, af-
fect international relations.
Diplomacy and the Drafting of Documents in
International Negotiations
The very nature of track-change diplomacy explains why
states can lose oversight, and how the process of negotia-
tion tends to gain a life of its own. The Lisbon Treaty (2009)
is a case in point. This treaty, which revised the institutional
setting of the European Union, includes several provisions
that none of the member states cared for. For example,
the Treaty’s infamous article 50, the so-called divorce clause
that the British government activated to begin Brexit, the
UK’s exit from the European Union, has a complex nego-
tiation history, which its authors do not fully recollect, nor
agree upon. According to Lord Kerr, former chief British
diplomat, the article was not directed at democratic member
states, but it would be triggered in the case of a dictatorship
(deWit 2016). Other members of the Convention on the Fu-
ture of Europe, including former Member of the European
Parliament, Andrew Duff, remember that the motivation be-
hind article 50 was purely symbolic, and that the article was
never meant to be used at all (2016). Such puzzling situ-
ations where states agree upon negotiation outcomes that
they did not really intend calls for an inside view into the
diplomatic engine room.
The study of international negotiations presents numer-
ous challenges. Even a relatively open multilateral body,
such as the European Union, is secretive when it comes
to the performance and defense of national interests. Con-
sequently, scholars and journalists rely on the outcome of
meetings in the form of official end documents, formal ne-
gotiation rules and distribution of votes, or draw on inter-
views with negotiators. These sorts of “outsiders” have diffi-
culties asking questions about phenomena they do not know
the existence of, or which they may consider irrelevant from
the outset, while diplomats might not be fully aware of all
the elements that shape their negotiations. Only a few schol-
ars have had the opportunity to actually observe confidential
multilateral negotiations. To the limited extent that interna-
tional relations, diplomatic and practice-oriented scholars
have analyzed text production in diplomacy, they have pri-
marily focused on communication within a national foreign
service (e.g., cables, notes, and strategy papers) or public
texts. Drawing on participant observation in the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iver B. Neumann has argued that
diplomatic documents such as speeches are about the pro-
duction of texts that “the entire ministry may stand behind”
(2012, 81; see also 2007) rather than attempts to produce or
communicate new policies (see also Cornut 2015).
Despite the valuable insights yielded by international
relations theory and specifically practice-oriented scholar-
ship on diplomatic text production such as the importance
of “pen-holding” in the UN Security Council (Ross 2007;
Farrall and Prantl 2016; Pouliot 2016a) or “audit culture”
(Kuus 2016), it has, so far, failed to consider the tools
used when producing text, or the way in which technology
contributes to representing national interests. Practice-
oriented scholars have analyzed text drafting as reflecting
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social dynamics in the negotiation, such as a “struggle over
competence” (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014) or “collective
consciousness” (Ralph and Gifkins 2017), but have not
addressed how text drafting coconstitutes social dynamics.
They have shown that diplomats conceive and handle mul-
tilateral agreements—whether declarations or international
law—from the very beginning as documents with shared au-
thorship.1 As Vincent Pouliot puts it, “[the] skillful practice
of multilateral negotiation is—literally—a collective accom-
plishment” (2016a, 16). Yet, this collective accomplishment,
as we will show, is not just due to socialization among perma-
nent representatives; the use of particular software and tech-
nology makes compromises possible. Even critical scholars,
while attending closely to “narratives of production”—for
example, the drafting of UN resolutions (Shepherd 2008)—
say little about the work of construction itself. Izadora Do
Monte mentions in passing that UN Security Council discus-
sions are “organized through electronic mail and ruled by
informal but well-established conventions. The outcome of
these discussions, either simply resolved by email exchanges
or after a real live discussion, is a resolution” (2016, 674).
In sum, while international relations scholars generally
acknowledge that “diplomacy has been influenced by the
development of available means of communication and
transportation” (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 90), they yet have
to integrate this observation when studying diplomacy.
Beyond international relations theory, there is a large
body of literature on the production of documents and
their role within organizations and bureaucracies (for an
overview, see Freeman and Maybin 2011). But researchers
have rarely established connection between these studies
and diplomatic scholarship (for an exception, see Dittmer
2016). Within anthropology and sociology, scholars such as
Latour (2005) and Hull (2012) highlight how everyday prac-
tices in producing documents—and the material qualities
of the text themselves—have tangible social effects. The in-
vention of the printing press was critical to the emergence
of modern science, just as particular material properties of
documents have enabled governments to act over time and
space (Latour 1986). Sociologist Richard Harper (1998) has
demonstrated by tracing “document careers” in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), it is possible to discern how
an organization is structured. Indeed, by studying the circu-
lation and materiality of documents such as paper quality,
stamps, and letterheads, as well as the aesthetics of textual
features—“paragraphs, tables, subtitles, fonts, margins, and
bullets” (Hull 2012, 255)—we can uncover how bureaucra-
cies function.
Annelise Riles (1998, 1999) comes closest to capturing
the nature of international negotiations of text in her fas-
cinating participant observations of the UN. As she shows,
delegations place their suggestions to a given text in brack-
ets. The aesthetics of creating a bracket-free “clean” text,
rather than having the text convey a particular meaning, be-
comes the primary logic that shapes the negotiation process.
Negotiators dismiss some versions of bracketed text, while
they consolidate others. Riles’s anthropology offers crucial
insight into everyday diplomatic document drafting, includ-
ing what scholars often overlook, but which is omnipresent
in multilateral negotiation: aesthetics. However, we still lack
knowledge about how diplomats use ICT during negotia-
tions; how it shapes expectations; and the implications for
1Pouliot (2011) and Adler-Nissen (2014) describe how national diplomats
rather than defending national interests in terms of substantive “win-sets” (as a
range of possible negotiation outcomes on which the parties can agree, Putnam
1988), translate opposing demands between their home and the multilateral UN
context they negotiate in.
international relations categories such as national interests,
compromises, and power. Our analysis points toward not
only the dynamics of face-to-face meetings (Holmes 2013),
but also the affordances of technology that help shape these
negotiations.
Technology and Practice in International Relations
Theory
In international relations theory, focusing on idealizations
of technology, rather than on technology in practice, can
easily distort our understanding of technology. In recent
years, however, concepts from STS and the subfield of ANT
have gained popularity among international relations schol-
ars in a bid to bring technology deeper into our understand-
ing of world politics. As an interdisciplinary research field,
STS is interested in the social constitution of science and
technology, and, in turn, how science and technology have
constitutive effects on society (Jacobsen 2015).
International relations scholars drawing on STS and ANT
aim to show how technologies facilitate different modes of
international politics. In a study of the materials of diplo-
matic practice, Pouliot observes that technology (such as
nuclear warheads) may even make people “do things they
would not have done otherwise” (2010, 294). Despite this
understanding, we still lack a precise explanation of what
precipitates this action. Concepts such as assemblage, actant,
and inscription are particularly relevant for our research aim,
but, as we will argue in this section, a theoretical language
to unpack how users enact technology in practice is still un-
derdeveloped.
The concept of assemblage is based on the idea that
humans, animals, and things dynamically relate to each
other in heterogeneous groups, from which productive
outcomes emerge beyond the individual (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987).2 Conceptually speaking, this means that in-
ternational organizations, diplomats, or foreign ministries
are not taken-for-granted entities, but rather traceable
physical and cognitive processes, events, buildings, bor-
ders, humans, and networks (Dittmer 2016; Hoijtink 2017;
Lisle 2018; McConnell and Dittmer 2018). Actor–Network
theory focuses on such assemblages (i.e., actor-networks).
Its founders, Michel Callon, John Law, and Bruno Latour,
developed the concept of actant—a term which asserts
the “quasi-agential properties of matter” (Coole 2013;
Cudworth and Hobden 2013; Mitchell 2014, 12). Actants
may be algorithms (Amoore and Raley 2017; Aradau and
Blanke 2017), drones (Leander 2013; Schandorf and Karat-
zogianni 2018), flags (Bueger 2013), or many other “things”
(Amicelle, Aradau, and Jeandesboz 2015; Salter 2015), and
these actants come together to form provisional relations of
actor-networks (Law 2008). Actants have agential features
in that they are a part of assemblages, where actions are
“the emergent product of myriad interacting forces and
bodies that collide, respond, react, and counteract one
another” (Mitchell 2014, 12; also see Aradau 2010; Balzacq
and Dunn Cavelty 2016). Surveillance assemblages, for
example, connect technologies such as biometric data col-
lection and body scanners in a way that resembles Foucault’s
panopticon (Muller, Cooke, Larrinaga, Frowd, Iossifova,
Johannes, Multu, et al. 2016). While generating important
insights, this approach does not systematically specify the
2 In his pioneering work on cyberspace, Ronald Deibert was among the first to
argue that the “material properties” (2003, 504) and “‘biases’ of communication
technologies [. . .] shape and constrain the environment within which communi-
cations take place” (503).
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mechanisms through which technology works nor bring
us much closer to an understanding of how ICT shapes
international negotiations.
The concept of inscriptions comes closer to addressing
our analytical needs by “making distant events and pro-
cesses visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents,
charts, forms, reports, signs and graphs” (Walters 2002, 84).
Inscriptions are the technologies through which actors seek
to translate the messiness of the world—in the laboratory,
the battlefield, or the market—into tangible knowledge
that is concrete and visible enough for governing purposes
(Aradau and Huysmans 2014). While not an STS scholar
and not explicitly making use of the notion of inscription,
Branch (2011) studies the role of maps in processes of
state formation in exactly this way. He demonstrates that
“new mapmaking technologies changed how actors thought
about political space, political organization, and political
authority” (Branch 2011, 1), subsequently influencing their
ideas of accepted governance. In a more recent article,
Branch (2017) claims that digital mapping technologies
structure territorial negotiations in unanticipated ways,
because they visualize territory differently from paper maps.
Similarly, while not using the concept of inscription, Der
Derian (2003) focuses on how technological developments
have resulted in new modes of representation in warfare,
changing the way soldiers perceive the battlefield and how
they act in it accordingly.
These different conceptual answers to the relationship be-
tween materiality and the social insist on the coconstitution
of technology and practice. Unfortunately, concepts such as
assemblage and actant lack analytical precision when it comes
to identifying the mechanisms of coconstitution. The con-
cept of inscription, in turn, is useful, but it limits the role of
technology to representations of reality. It does not encom-
pass that people can use technology as tools to physically aid
in actions on the material world, thereby changing it (nu-
clear weapons, for example, are not inscriptions). Moreover,
as Nexon and Pouliot (2013) have argued, there is a discrep-
ancy between ANT and international relations theory, in the
sense that ANT tends to focus on concrete microprocesses,
whereas international relations theories predominantly re-
volve around macroprocesses.
The next sections add to the international relations lit-
erature on technology by responding to the challenges of
analytical precision and relation to macrophenomena. We
show that affordance is a theoretical concept geared for
an analysis of the forms of action that technologies make
possible—but also that these affordances shape macrophe-
nomena such as national interests, negotiations, and, ulti-
mately, international governance.
Theorizing Technology in Practice: An Affordance
Approach
To explore track-change diplomacy and precisely identify
how ICT and international practices relate requires com-
bining insights from STS, organization, media, and commu-
nication studies, and practice theory. Specifically, we intro-
duce the notion of affordance, understood as possibilities for
action—that is, how an object or technology both enables
and constrains the tasks that users can possibly perform with
it (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, and Treem 2017, 36).
Cognitive psychologist James J. Gibson developed the no-
tion of affordance in 1977 to explain how people orient
themselves to objects in their world in terms of the possibil-
ities these objects afford for action. Donald Norman (1988)
popularized affordance in studies of human–machine inter-
action, documenting examples of “bad design.” Affordances
are now key to how social sciences conceptualized technol-
ogy’s role in society (e.g., Hutchby 2001; Hine 2008). The
concept is relational—representing potential interactions
between people and technology, rather than being a prop-
erty of either alone. This relational view also explains why
there is no singular theory of affordances, as each emerges
based on the technology’s material features and contextual
functionality (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, and Treem 2017, 36).
Casting an everyday perspective on technology with
our affordance approach, we are inspired by organiza-
tional scholars such as Orlikowski, who developed the term
“technology-in-use” (Orlikowski, Yates, Okamura, and Fuji-
moto 1995) to point out that technologies seldom bring pre-
dictable effects to social life. Instead, technological artifacts
operate within a web of organizational, occupational, and
institutional forces. A practice perspective on technology ac-
counts for the fact that people, organizations, and states do
not always “realize the apparent potential of a technology
when they use it” (Majchrzak and Markus 2013, 3), and can
sometimes use technology in ways the designers never in-
tended. An affordance approach highlights that technology
creates conditions for specific forms of human agency, and
thus, contrary to most STS- and ANT-inspired international
relations scholarship, we do not see technology as having
agency in and of itself.
To understand why different individuals and organiza-
tions do different things with the same technology requires
understanding how cultures and habits shape our use of
technology. At the same time, we cannot reduce the use
of technology to human attributes such as culture, norms,
or habits. We have to understand it in relation to what ac-
tions the technology makes possible. The concept of af-
fordance expresses this interrelation between technological
functionality and social practice. An affordance approach is
agnostic to particular features of a technology and, instead,
asks what combination of features enable and constrain the
ways people use technology (Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak,
Dougherty, and Faraj 2007, 752).3
To develop this concept for international relations theory,
we focus on three affordances of ICT that we have identified
as significant influences in diplomatic negotiations: share-
ability, visualization, and immediacy.
Shareability
The first affordance of ICT is what we refer to as share-
ability. Advances in ICT enable a large number of actors
to work on a single (or similar) document across different
locations, with several practical implications. Firstly, it can
broaden participation in an organization’s decision-making
processes by including people who may otherwise be work-
ing on the periphery. Virtual collaboration increases the po-
tential for bringing people from different organizations and
disciplines together, while documenting their decision ratio-
nales and work processes in real time (Zammuto, Griffith,
Majchrzak, Dougherty, and Faraj 2007, 756). Secondly, it fos-
ters a sense of collaboration and transparency, as it stream-
lines the ability to not only share but also integrate oth-
ers’ knowledge (Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty,
and Faraj 2007, 755). In international negotiations, this
translates into connecting capital cities more closely to
3Technology features are the ways “that [a technology’s] physical and/or dig-
ital materials are arranged into particular forms that endure across differences in
place and time” (Leonardi 2012, 42).
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their diplomats abroad. It also affords a more inclusive,
decentralized organization of foreign policy that incorpo-
rates other ministries and parliaments, and potentially even
substate actors. Enhanced shareability makes rapid feedback
possible by enabling quick probes and clarifications from
varied sources.
While enhanced shareability affords more input from cap-
itals, in large multilateral settings that negotiate on a daily
basis, the massive expansion of individuals involved in diplo-
matic negotiations is likely to result in the individual ne-
gotiator losing control. The lack of centralized procedures
coupled with the high speed of back-and-forth negotiations
leads to power emerging from the negotiation process, as we
will explain further below.
Visualization
The second affordance of ICT is what we call visualization.
It affords the ability to observe entire work processes in
action from end to end, represented through language or
images that aid our thought processes in important ways.
How we visualize certain phenomena affects how we ad-
dress them. The philosophers and cognitive scientists Clark
and Chalmers refer to “active externalism” to highlight how
our environment drives cognitive processes (1998, 7). Ob-
jects and technologies help us to not only do things differ-
ently, but also shape the way we think (Clark and Chalmers
1998, 8). We reduce the computational load of our brain
by manipulating external devices and cultural artifacts such
as maps and texts to solve convoluted problems. While this
sort of visualization is important for cognitive processes
on an individual level, it is even more relevant in collec-
tive decision-making. Visualization is an important element
of communication (Weber 2008). Visualization aids under-
standing, it helps keeping a “live record” and enables col-
lective sense-making as “people figure out how to respond”
(Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty, and Faraj 2007,
754).
Visualization fundamentally underpins the sorts of so-
lutions that diplomats identify in international conflicts.
When diplomats negotiate over territorial disputes, the ways
in which they draw up the territory constitutively affects the
course of negotiations and the solutions that will emerge
(Branch 2012, 2017). Similarly, when diplomats visualize the
object of their negotiations in text form, and signify changes
to the text with the help of track-changes, bold text, or
brackets, then they will express the national position in the
international dispute in the form of text edits. They seek
the solution to a particular dispute with the help of draft-
ing exercises, as opposed to drawing a boundary on a map.
In other words, how diplomats visualize the object of diplo-
matic negotiation has constitutive effects on how they estab-
lish the national position toward the object, and how they
identify a compromise.
Immediacy
The third affordance that we wish to highlight is immediacy.
ICT enables “unprecedented speed of access to materials
and world events as they happen” (Conole and Dyke 2004,
116). Despite the wealth of information now within reach,
speed can raise issues of quality and imply lacking reflec-
tion or critical judgment. The speed with which individu-
als can now exchange information has also shifted expecta-
tions in terms of response times. Organization scholars have
shown how this intensifies working patterns, with responses
expected almost immediately and an increasing number of
back-and-forth edits among more authors than in the past
(Conole and Dyke 2004, 116). Today diplomats create and
recreate documents, and constantly negotiate meanings in
rapid feedback circles within the European Union.
Communication speed has a phenomenological effect:
[Speed] promotes a more pragmatic, reflexive imme-
diate response to new information, as it is pixilated
across our screens. This can be said to be particularly
true of email, where nowadays users are bombarded
with so much information that there is a tendency to
skim read and adopt a surface approach in terms of
reacting to responses and requests. (Conole and Dyke
2004, 118)
While speed tends to reduce diplomats’ and leaders’ at-
tention span in their everyday activities, they can consciously
counteract these tendencies when dealing with issues of vi-
tal national interest. Under these circumstances, they will
undertake their best efforts to remain focused. The litera-
ture surrounding cognitive psychology and social practices
suggests that when difficulties arise, people will raise their
awareness (for an overview, see Hopf 2018). In other words,
in moments of crisis, deliberate reflection replaces default
automaticity (Bourdieu 2007; Baumeister and Bargh 2014).
For this reason, a crucial aspect of the technology–
diplomacy interaction is not just how word processing soft-
ware speeds up the circulation of texts, but also how nego-
tiators handle that speed, how they experience and assess it,
and, ultimately, how that shapes international relations. For
example, the introduction of the telegraph in the 1830s rev-
olutionized diplomacy (Nickles 2009). The technology obvi-
ously made it possible to speed up the transfer of messages,
but it did more than that. It provoked counter-moves from
diplomats keen to protect their autonomy abroad. It also led
foreign ministries to compose more concise messages be-
cause telegraph services were expensive, thereby changing
the language of diplomacy (Nickles 2009, 3).
We expect that in highly institutionalized multilateral
settings where continuous international negotiations take
place, the affordance of immediacy will result in shorter at-
tention spans during day-to-day negotiations, unless the or-
ganization has a slow-moving deliberative culture. By con-
trast, when one-off negotiations of vital national interest are
on the table, participants will do their utmost to increase
their attention span and diplomatic focus.
Summing up our theory, in accordance with the affor-
dance approach, we do not make causal claims, but specify
conditions of possibility. Thus, we do not predict whether
track-change diplomacy will lead to compromise solutions in
specific negotiations; the practice does not determine spe-
cific outcomes. Diplomats themselves do not know whether
their efforts will succeed, but they use track-change diplo-
macy as their go-to approach to solve disputes. Nor do we
predict precisely when loss of authorship will occur or when
the negotiating parties will agree upon a text that none of
them intended. We propose necessary, not sufficient con-
ditions: in large multilateral settings operating under in-
creased time pressure and with a loaded agenda, track-
change diplomacy can make smooth negotiations possible,
with the side effect that in moments when diplomats lose
focus, it can lead to a loss of control. Inversely, when diplo-
mats and leaders have made key national interests explicit,
they will do their best to remain focused and retain some
measure of control.
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Ethnographic Methods: Participant Observation,
Documents, and Interviews
This section briefly outlines our ethnographic approach
while our online supplementary appendix provides de-
tails on the diplomatic setting, sources, methods, analyt-
ical strategy, and relevant literature on EU negotiations
and ethnography in international relations scholarship.
Our technology-in-practice approach implies an inductive
methodology. As mentioned in the introduction, observers
of diplomacy would not necessarily know about the exis-
tence of track-change diplomacy unless they became privy
to the practice.
By analyzing how diplomats conduct negotiations in
the European Union’s multilevel system, we focus on the
Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives): the
diplomatic engine room where ambassadors of the EU
member states negotiate. Coreper meets in Brussels every
week and prepares the Council of Ministers in its various
formations. At Coreper, the ambassadors negotiate many of
the politically contentious issues that their subordinates can-
not solve at working group level. Coreper is not very visi-
ble to the general public, and it operates largely behind the
scenes. As such, this forum resolves a significant number of
issues on a de facto basis during its meetings, although na-
tional Ministers in the Council are the ones who hold the
legislative power (Lewis 2016).
The European Union is not a typical international or-
ganization, which raises the question of generalizability to
other multilateral settings. Yet, in aspects pertaining to
track-change diplomacy, the European Union does not sub-
stantially differ from other multilateral organizations. First,
while Coreper interacts frequently, thereby affecting the me-
chanics of track-change diplomacy, equivalent bodies in the
UN or NATO also meet regularly (Pouliot 2016b). Second,
the European Union has substantive areas in which it does
not take decisions unanimously, but by Qualified Majority
Voting, whichmay affect the speed of negotiations andmake
them even faster. However, in substance, we can observe the
same mechanisms in areas where the European Union takes
decisions by unanimity—even during major treaty revisions
such as the Lisbon Treaty, for example (Interview November
21, 2014; Interview December 12, 2014). Third, the binding
status of EU legislation and the extensive powers of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) might influence the mechan-
ics of track-change diplomacy. But, again, we have identi-
fied the same mechanisms in areas in which the ECJ does
not have any jurisdiction, and in non–legally binding docu-
ments. Lastly, one might argue that the European Union is
a special case because of the high degree of trust between
frequently interacting parties. While EU negotiators do not
distrust each other to the extent that warring parties do, the
European Union’s working environment certainly contends
with the same interpersonal tensions as we expect in other
large organizations.
In fact, we find similar patterns of track-change diplomacy
identified in the European Union in other multilateral orga-
nizations such as the UN (Riles 1998), UNESCO (Schaefer
2017), and NATO. Also, the more hybrid multilateral insti-
tutional environments, such as the Contact Group on Piracy
(Bueger 2017), exhibit similar dynamics. While diplomats
also use track-changes when drafting bilateral agreements,
we do not expect bilateral diplomacy to have the exact same
characteristics. We can attribute these differences to norms
and habits typically found in legalized, multilateral organiza-
tions with many countries involved, compared with the less
institutionalized practices of bilateral diplomacy (Pouliot
2011). The number of actors involved in the negotiation
process also makes a difference. Moreover, we cannot expect
the same track-change dynamics when states’ vital national
interests are at stake or when they are deliberately seeking
to delay agreements.
We gathered most of the empirical material during two-
and-a-half months of participant observation in the perma-
nent representation of an EU member state and in the
Council of Ministers in Brussels in 2014. During this period,
one of the authors attended Coreper meetings. She also
attended numerous working group meetings and Council
meetings, as well as the consultations prior to Council and
Coreper meetings between Ministers and the ambassador,
and between attachés and the ambassador. The other author
worked in the Department of European Policy of a member
state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year (2010–2011),
where she helped prepare European Council and Council
of Ministers meetings and participated in drafting instruc-
tions, while attending various meetings in Brussels.
The participant observations inform the core of the anal-
ysis. In addition, we analyzed 266 internal documents that
were circulated in preparation for Coreper meetings during
the two-and-a-half month period. These documents consist
primarily of draft legislation with suggested text edits, Pres-
idency compromise solutions to outstanding issues of nego-
tiations, instructions from a member state, and diplomats’
summaries of negotiations.
We supplemented the participant observations with in-
sights from numerous open-ended interviews both authors
conducted during the period 2007–2018 with among others
active and former Coreper ambassadors, Council secretariat
officials, Members of the European Parliament, and em-
ployees of the Commission. The interviews served to clarify
observed incidents. We have anonymized informants (and
most country names) to respect their confidentiality and
protect informants’ identities.
The participant observations provide exceptional insights
to the day-to-day proceedings of negotiations, but also have
certain limitations. First, because of the limited time we were
allowed to spend in the Permanent Representation and the
Council, it was impossible to follow one piece of legislation
through from inception by the Commission to its final adop-
tion by the Council and the European Parliament. To be
able to analyze the entire negotiation process, we therefore
had to rely on different pieces of legislation in their respec-
tive stages. Second, conducting participant observation also
meant that we could not select the dossier (i.e., a particu-
lar negotiated text) on the basis of predefined criteria. In-
stead, we studied dossiers as they unfolded in front of our
eyes, without knowing how they would develop. So, rather
than concentrating the analysis on one piece of legislation,
we highlight more general patterns of negotiations as we
observed them across different cases. This aligns with the
inductive method of “practice tracing,” that seeks to “map
the ways of doing things that [. . .] characterize a given
social configuration” (Pouliot 2014, 273), and then analyt-
ically generate broader patterns from these concrete obser-
vations.
Track-Change Diplomacy in the European Union
From delivering post by wagon to today’s word process-
ing software, the nature of diplomacy has advanced along-
side ICT. As the French historian Fernand Braudel (1995
[1966]) explains, in the sixteenth century, the “[s]tatesmen
and ambassadors, whom we usually imagine with weighty
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matters on their minds, are often preoccupied by the arrival
or delays of the mail” (Braudel, quoted in Fletcher 2015,
114). Uncertainty about not just when, but if letters and doc-
uments would ever reach the envoy hindered international
negotiations. The horse carriage and the improvement of
road and rail traffic led to incremental improvements in
communications, but prior to the late nineteenth century,
limited communication was still a major obstacle to diplo-
macy (Black 2010, 49). As late as 1980s, junior diplomats
from EU member states were sitting up all night at the em-
bassy in Brussels, where the one computer dedicated to re-
ceive confidential material was located. They waited for draft
conclusions, then photocopied them and slid them under
the hotel room door of the members of the national delega-
tion at 4 am (Interview April 18, 2018).
Some characteristics that defined negotiations in Coreper
in 1958, when it was established, are equally important to-
day. Notably, negotiations center on textual edits. This is
not surprising given that many of the word processing fea-
tures used today “build historically on aesthetics, discourse
genres, means of distribution, concepts of authorship and
ownership, etc., that were developed through the media of
paper” (Hull 2012, 261). In other words, the affordances
of visualization on paper and word processing features are
quite similar, meaning that they affect diplomatic negotia-
tions in similar, albeit nonidentical ways.
By contrast, advancements in ICT have considerably af-
fected the affordances of immediacy and shareability. As one
senior diplomat recalls:
Without thinking, we have just increased the speed
and complexity. We handle dossiers just as fast as
we did when we were 15 [member states] as we do
when we are 28 countries around the table. Basi-
cally, enlargement [in 2004, the EU grew from fif-
teen to twenty-five with the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries] wouldn’t have been possible without
email, mobile phones and software. (Interview April
18, 2018)
Track-change diplomacy as the combination of advanced
ICT and diplomatic practices has three defining characteris-
tics: shared authorship, which involves including many peo-
ple from geographically dispersed regions and institutions; a
particular aesthetic centering on textual edits with the help
of word processing features; and a high speed of negoti-
ations and textual circulation. This section will show how
in multilateral settings that negotiate on a continuous ba-
sis, these three characteristics collectively shape key interna-
tional relations categories: negotiators define the national
interest as textual edits in a compressed two-level game
(Putnam 1988), they reach compromises through aesthet-
ically circumscribed drafting exercises, and power is emer-
gent. In some instances, when nonvital national interests are
involved, the characteristics of track-change diplomacy can
result in diplomats losing control over the negotiation pro-
cess and even adopting legislation that none of the negoti-
ating parties intended.
Shareability: From Shared Authorship to Loss of Authorship in
Drafting EU Legislation
The first characteristic of track-change diplomacy is share-
ability, given the large number of actors who work on a
single document across different locations. When one fol-
lows the circulation of a draft for an ordinary legislative act
through the European Union, it is clear that massive coor-
dination efforts are required for reaching a compromise,
which track-change technology makes possible.
The European Commission initiates a text with the in-
volvement of several Directorate Generals and consultations
with member states and stakeholders. The text then goes
to the Council of Ministers, where it passes through vari-
ous working groups. The member state representatives as
part of these working groups can receive instructions from
multiple domestic ministries, and potentially their national
parliaments. The text will then go to the Coreper ambas-
sador meeting before the Council of Ministers decides on
it. Various political parties negotiate over the text in the
European Parliament, and the European Union has only
adopted the legal document once the European Parliament
and the Council of Ministers have reached an agreement
(for more detail, see the online ethnographic methods ap-
pendix).
This brief elaboration highlights the many different
hands through which the text circulates. As one diplomat
explains:
There is not one author. It is a collective enterprise.
Many people are involved. Many institutions are in-
volved. It is the machine of searching for a compro-
mise, which writes the text. (Interview November 20,
2014)
Beyond the technology of track-changes, social norms
guide the changes that individuals are allowed to make, so
that reaching a compromise between so many actors be-
comes possible. For example, member states have to show
flexibility wherever they can. They have also learned to
aggregate positions. To get edits approved, others need to
support one’s position. Aggregation is crucial to make
the interactions between twenty-eight member states, the
various national ministries, and the EU institutions more
meaningful.
One of the consequences of shareability as an affor-
dance for international diplomacy is that capital cities can
potentially better oversee the negotiations:
I remember, previously, you said: “Okay, I take this
one,” and then I had to defend the choice at home,
but today you say, “give me five minutes, and I’ve spo-
ken to my Prime Minister.” The autonomy of Coreper
ambassadors is gone. (Interview April 15, 2018)
However, the implications of shareability are not as
straightforward. The fact that track-change diplomacy allows
the text to circulate through so many different iterations,
creates a situation of shared authorship that can occasion-
ally result in a loss of authorship. As a Member of the Eu-
ropean Parliament explains: “so many people are involved,
you cannot foresee what the outcome [. . .] is going to be,”
(Interview November 20, 2014). Contrary to what we com-
monly believe—that writing is a case of “highly controlled
sign usage” (Hirschauer 2016, 55, authors’ translation)—
the intricate circulation process that negotiation documents
go through means that diplomats can, at times, lose control
over the production of those signs. While bureaucracies are
generally able to expose a similar phenomenon of loss of
authorship resulting from a specific bureaucratic culture (as
per Weber), observing it in diplomatic negotiations, where
diplomats are supposed to represent the interests of states
as independent actors, is considerably more fascinating, as
it opposes the dominant understanding of what diplomacy
is all about.
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Visualization: Using Word Processing Software to Reach Agreements
The second characteristic of track-change diplomacy re-
lates to the affordance of visualization. In the European
Union, negotiations are extremely aesthetic and text
oriented. Diplomats use various Microsoft Word functions
to highlight proposed text edits and bring out the differ-
ent positions of the negotiators. Each of these functions ful-
fills the role of making changes more visible and therefore
allowing diplomats to negotiate around those changes. For
example, the table with four columns (see Figure 1) is a typ-
ical stylistic device used during trialogues.4 The table permits
three institutions (the Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, and the Council) to add their amendments to individ-
ual paragraphs side by side. This makes it easy for a reader
to identify and compare them, while the fourth column is
left for the compromise solution. The table works well for
three negotiating parties, but it would be significantly more
challenging to use for all twenty-eight member states. Tools
with different affordances for visualizing text edits, such
as the track-change function, are more useful under these
circumstances.
In terms of formatting, Presidency suggestions for a com-
promise text at Coreper ambassadorial meetings usually
have “new text in Bold and underlined. Deleted text is in
strikethrough” (Legislative proposal by a member state,
November 11, 2014). Changes the Council Legal Service
proposed for legal accuracy are Bold and double underlined
and double strikethrough Gray shading serves to highlight
politically contentious issues. Alternatively, diplomats can
use red font. [Square brackets] indicate that the negotia-
tors have not yet agreed on something. Footnotes commonly
serve to write down the delegations’ suggestions for modifi-
cations to the text, or to highlight delegations’ scrutiny and
parliamentary reservations. Occasionally, they use the com-
ments function (see Figure 2).
All of these tools are visual markers that allow the dele-
gations to focus on specific passages of the text, while let-
ting the rest fade into the background. The comparison be-
tween new and old text becomes easily discernible. These
tools help to increase the speed of textual revisions, but they
also draw out certain passages from the document’s overall
context. As a result, diplomats can easily focus on the de-
tails of particular wordings, over which they then negotiate
out of context. They can lose the overview of the entire text
and, therefore, lose sight of the actual subject of their nego-
tiations, contributing to a loss of authorship.
Before text edits reach a point where the Presidency
consolidates them into a single set of proposed revisions,
national delegations use track-changes to make their sug-
gestions to the text (see Figure 3). Compared with the use
of bold and underlined formatting, track-changes lead to
the propositions’ lower degree of authority, as the delete op-
tion is already an integral command function. At the same
time, the suggestive nature of track-changes inspires to
create new text. Using track-changes allows readers to track
multiple authors, which is unnecessary in the case of one
set of changes the Presidency has consolidated. Although
technically possible, this tracing of authorship becomes
impractical when many individuals negotiate over a text.
Immediacy: The Speed of Text Circulation through the EU Apparatus
Information and communication technology permits a third
characteristic of track-change diplomacy: immediacy. To an
4Trialogues refer to negotiations between the European Commission, the Pres-
idency of the Council of Ministers, and the Rapporteur of the European Parlia-
ment.
outsider, the European Union might appear to be a slow-
moving bureaucracy; but for the people involved in the in-
ternal negotiations, they occur at a very high speed. The fast
circulation of text among many actors that advancements
in ICT make possible also generates expectations of fast re-
sponses. Being constantly bombarded with emails can be
quite stressful: “If you haven’t been up during the night to
go to the toilet [and check your mobile phone], then peo-
ple cannot understand why you haven’t answered” (Inter-
view April 18, 2018).
As one senior diplomat notes:
Things need to be very swift, because we are working
up against a deadline, so it’s seen as good service by
the Presidency to send an email and say: ‘Here is the
document,’ and they will often send it out at 4pm in
the afternoon for a meeting at 10 or 11am the next
day. This wasn’t the way we operated previously. Before
mobile phones, there was a compromise text and then
you would have one or two days to react. Time has be-
come compressed. Sometimes I receive a new text in
the rotating door into Lipsius [the Council of Minis-
ters building in Brussels] on the way into the meeting.
(Interview April 18, 2018)
The high speed may, in part, be self-perpetuating with
the urge to respond quickly emerging from shared experi-
ences of rapid text circulation. But it is also due to a more
or less implicit norm of measuring success on the basis of
how many texts diplomats have approved. To reach a speedy
agreement and get legislation through the apparatus might
be one of the most crucial objectives underlying the negoti-
ation process today.
Information and communication technology in tandem
with individual role perceptions supports fast negotiations.
Given Coreper’s substantial agenda and the fact that there
are twenty-eight member states around the table, the ambas-
sadors are not allowed to speak for more than three minutes
per item. They often make explicit that they comply with
these rules or apologize if they do not: “Sorry I took up a
lot of time there, but I think it was important,” (Coreper 1,
February 18, 2015). The silent procedure also enhances the
speed of negotiations. It implies that Coreper has adopted
a proposal, unless a member state objects within one of
the deadlines specified by the Presidency (General Secre-
tariat of the Council of the EU 2011, 56). Furthermore,
“agreed language” expedites searching for compromises.
Agreed language refers to formulations that diplomats have
agreed upon in previously approved texts. Diplomats copy
and paste these directly into new texts that address similar
issues. The purpose is to save time and to avoid replicating
the same complex procedures of searching for a compro-
mise. One possible danger of this procedure is that the in-
sertion of agreed language passages into a slightly different
context may create new, unintended meanings.
The three affordances of ICT—shareability, visualization,
and immediacy—fundamentally shape how negotiators de-
fine national interests, how they reach compromises, and
what constitutes power in large multilateral settings.
Defining the National Interest as Text Edits
One of the key questions in diplomacy is how the na-
tional interest gets represented and performed. Concretely,
national capitals write the national interest in their in-
structions to the EU delegations. Yet, as we will show in
this section, the way in which capitals produce these in-
structions makes it clear that EU negotiations do not cen-
ter around predefined interests, but rather around the
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Figure 1. Example of the table used at trialogue negotiations
performance of interests expressed through text revisions
using a particular software that also shapes the way diplo-
mats conduct these edits. In short, the text helps produce
national interests—just as much as the national interests are
manifest in the text. The somewhat emblematic national in-
terest emerges out of the negotiation process, based on the
three affordances we have identified.
The high speed of ICT means that email and mobile de-
vices afford almost complete flexibility in terms of being
able to constantly edit the text. Previously, the capital sent
instructions to the embassy (since instructions represent the
government’s view), but in practice, it was often the repre-
sentative in the mission abroad who wrote a first draft the
capital then approved. These days, this has taken a radical
turn with instructions sometimes drafted at the same time
as negotiations take place. A diplomat highlights, “We work
a lot with the instructions. It may as well go back and forth a
number of times” (Interview April 20, 2015).
The affordance of shareability, together with the impera-
tive of high speed, circumscribes the national interest. The
Presidency needs to aggregate national positions between
multiple delegations, and there are unwritten rules on how
many edits (i.e., track-changes) one country is allowed to
make. As one senior diplomat in the Council secretariat ex-
plains:
It happens regularly that a country uses too many
track-changes and then it has no impact. We simply
ignore it. We can’t take that seriously. We cannot take
that much from one single delegation. The delegation
must find out what’s most important. (Interview April
15, 2018)
The affordance of ICT visualization shapes the aesthetic
form that a national interest takes. A discussion during the
negotiations of the Single European Sky 2 + (SES 2 + ) leg-
islation, which regulates EU airspace, illustrates how the aes-
thetics afforded by Microsoft Word enact the national inter-
est. To understand this negotiation context, it is important
to know that Spain and the UK’s ongoing sovereignty dis-
pute over Gibraltar complicated the SES 2 + negotiations.
Both parties disagreed about whether to include Gibraltar
airport in the legislation. The ambassadors at Coreper could
not find a solution to this key issue concerning national
sovereignty, so they left the topic for the Transport Council
on December 3, 2014. The UK expressed its national posi-
tion in the form that it “will only accept a general approach
if it is absolutely clear that Gibraltar will be included, with-
out footnotes in 5 and 2.” For Spain, the national position
was to include a text in the SES 2 + legislation, which rec-
ommended “temporally [to suspend] the application to this
airport until an agreement has been reached between Spain
and the UK.” To move the legislation forward, the Presi-
dency proposed to:
[. . .] put paragraph 5 in square brackets, and include
a footnote stating ‘the issue as to how in the text to
reflect Gibraltar will depend on the results of talks be-
tween the UK and Spain.’ The other two footnotes will
be deleted, and I hope that this will be a neutral solu-
tion. [. . .] There are precedents for this type of solu-
tion. The proposal that we are making is that we would
have a general approach, paragraph 5 in square brack-
ets, with a footnote.
Spain responded:
The solution is neutral, so we are able to approve the
solution. We still stick to our solution, but with a view
to reaching an agreement we can accept that solution.
To the surprise of those present, the British Minister re-
fused the proposal on the grounds that it “is not a neu-
tral approach.” Given that the remaining interested parties
thought it was a neutral solution, the Presidency had the
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Figure 2. Examples of Presidency suggestions for a compromise text
member states vote on the general approach with the com-
promise solution, although it concerned an issue of vital
national interest. The UK voted against it, but the general
approach passed because it was in a policy area of Quali-
fied Majority Voting. This illustrates that when vital national
interests are involved, the parties do their utmost to retain
control.
The Reaching of Compromises through Drafting Exercises: Getting to
the Clean Text
As indicated in the example above, negotiations take place
through text edits, and the European Union has developed
a real skill of reaching compromise solutions through “draft-
ing exercises”—a process where diplomats draft and redraft
texts until they have identified an agreeable solution in the
wording of a text. The speed and aesthetic affordances of
ICT are crucial for the practices through which negotiators
seek compromises in large multilateral settings.
One strategy of collective drafting, for which the affor-
dances of shareability and immediacy are key, is to split the
text into pieces that negotiators then circulate in parallel
with the more official negotiation process. Whereas they
circulate the official documents in full length with track-
changes, the use of mobile devices encourages small snip-
pets and fragments of text to circulate at the same time, as
member states cut and paste their way to compromise. As
one ambassador explains:
We had an Eastern Partnership summit where we
needed to refer to language on ‘European aspirations
for Ukraine.’ The working group had negotiated long
and hard and couldn’t get any further. At the one end,
you had [Member State 1] blocking. They could not
accept any recognition, any aspirations for Ukraine
whatsoever. On the other end you had [Member State
2] and some of the other [States], [Member State 3]
and [Member State 4] that couldn’t get enough. I was
tasked by the Presidency to find a compromise. So be-
tween two Coreper meetings, I worked with the Exter-
nal Service. First, I called my colleague from [Member
State 2]. Then I sent a text to my [Member State 1]
colleague, and we pushed it back and forth over the
phone. And then they started to see themselves in the
text. And then at Coreper, the compromise was pre-
sented orally. . . . (Interview April 15, 2018)
These are the hidden layers of negotiations that ICT
makes possible.
The visualization of ICT also shapes how negotiators work
with textual edits, and how they reach compromises. In the
negotiations concerning Council Conclusions for an Educa-
tion, Youth, Culture and Sport Council for instance, how
to treat e-books and regular books became a contentious
issue between Northern and Southern states. The text the
Presidency initially proposed explicitly referenced the dif-
ferences in VAT applied to regular books and e-books. How-
ever, Northern states argued that VAT does not lie within
the competency of the Council for Education, Youth, Cul-
ture and Sport, but in that of the Economic and Financial
Council. For this reason, they wanted to omit the statement.
Given this resistance, the Presidency changed the text to:
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Figure 2. Continued
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, en-
hance creativity, support access to culture, cultural di-
versity, [. . .] develop awareness of a European iden-
tity and to support the application to e-books of the
same treatment applied to printed books5 (diplomatic
notes).6
Several member states still opposed this text, so the Presi-
dency made further changes:
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, en-
hance creativity, support access to culture, cultural di-
versity, [. . .] develop awareness of a European iden-
tity and to consider to apply support the application to
e-books of the same treatment applied to printed
books. (ibid)
The like-minded states that disagreed with this proposal
developed their own compromise text, which read:
promote reading, through printed books as well as
e-books, as a tool to spread knowledge, enhance cre-
ativity, support access to culture, and cultural diversity,
[. . .] develop awareness of a European identity and to
support the application to e-books of the same treat-
ment applied to printed books. (ibid)
As this text was not satisfying the Southern states, one
state suggested another alternative wording:
5New proposal from the presidency.
6We copied the quotes’ formatting from the original internal documents in
which they appeared.
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, en-
hance creativity, support access to culture, cultural di-
versity, [. . .] develop awareness of a European identity,
and to apply support the application also applying to
e-books of the same treatment applied to printed
books, except where different treatment results from
EU-law. (ibid)
But this wording was unacceptable to both groups, so the
ambassadors at Coreper were unable to agree and left the is-
sue for the Council of Ministers. The final compromise text
in the Conclusions on a Work Plan for Culture (2015–2018)
reads:
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, en-
hance creativity, support access to culture and cultural
diversity and develop awareness of a European iden-
tity, taking into account the various conditions applied
to e-books and physical books.
The shareability, visualization, and immediacy of ICT al-
low many actors to negotiate at high speed around textual
edits. It also means that the substance of the negotiations
can occasionally fade from view in a quest to get the word-
ing right, and with a focus on only the contentious textual
passages, not the full document. During negotiations, the
text acquires a particular meaning. Thus, in the example
above, the claim that “equal treatment of e-books and regu-
lar books” refers to an equal VAT is not apparent from the
language itself; it only emerged in relation to the different
positions at the negotiation table.
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Figure 3. Example of a track-changed document
Once the text is enshrined in law, it often acquires a new
meaning that is in line with the practices of legal inter-
pretation. This legal meaning can be quite different from
the meaning that emerged during negotiations or that the
diplomats who wrote the text intended.7
In a dispute between the Council Legal Service and mem-
ber states over the meaning of a clause in the European
Union’s Lisbon Treaty, the Council Legal Service responded
in an informal meeting (November 11, 2014):
Send us legal arguments about this, not political ones.
Usually we stop at the letter of the treaty. I understand
that you are not satisfied with it at all. [. . . ] We cannot
rely too much on the history of treaty making, on the
travaux preparatoires to the treaty, we have to find the
arguments in the law as is.
Clearly, the text has gained a life of its own.
Emergent Power in Track-Change Diplomacy
One of the benefits of an affordance approach to tech-
nology is that it overrules the idea that technology has
any automatic consequences, thereby allowing for human
agency. Human agency does not disappear with tech-
nology; what a given technology and established societal
practices offer shape its expression. Within international
relations theory, scholars often see agency as an exclusive
prerogative of the human domain involving intention and
freedom of will—which is particularly evident in interna-
tional negotiation studies (see Braun, Schindler, and Wille
2018). A range of perspectives, from poststructuralism, over
ANT, to practice scholarship have criticized this assumption
of conscious agency. For instance, practice scholars promote
a logic of practice over a logic of consequences or appro-
priateness when analyzing diplomacy (Adler-Nissen 2016).
7Occasionally negotiators can deliberately leave text unclear, knowing that
they are unable to solve disagreements—in tune with Kissinger’s understanding
of constructive ambiguity (Jegen and Mérand 2014). However, at other times, the
process can be automatic and unintentional.
This explains why Pouliot can quote a UN diplomat as say-
ing: “Diplomatic issues are not resolved through the quality
of arguments, but thanks to a capacity to imagine steps that
people can engage in [and to find] the next step to rally
people to move forward” (2016a, 16).
However, this narrative still allocates agency and power
with human agency and creativity. Our analysis of track-
change diplomacy shows that multilateral negotiations are
more radical. Writing diplomatic text cannot be reduced
to human agency (i.e., moves of diplomats alone), but it
is shaped by technological affordances that significantly im-
pact how diplomats think and handle text as a collective net-
worked exercise. As we have demonstrated, the negotiation
process itself takes an emergent character as ambassadors
continuously circulate and edit text, while they experience
being stripped of the agency they once had.
What we suggest here is that if it is not merely the meeting
of different national interests, diplomats represent around a
negotiation table, that produces the text, then track-change
diplomacy enables power to work in a different way. Being
influential as a diplomat entails being able to use technol-
ogy effectively. This means being able to edit text and time
interventions at a high speed. Of course, the size of mem-
ber states will influence their ability to get edits approved,
because individual voting weights in the Council determine
a certain hierarchy and social pressures associated with that
hierarchy (Pouliot 2016b; Towns and Rumelili 2017).
It is clear that a small country cannot take the floor as
the first [member state] each time. It would be totally
out of place [. . .] It would also be noticed if we always
have to say something to all agenda points. (Interview
January 1, 2015)
Ultimately, however, the most crucial diplomatic skill in
terms of enhancing a state’s negotiating position is the abil-
ity to maneuver one’s edits through a complicated nego-
tiation process. In this sense, the text becomes the object
over which diplomats hold the negotiations. Power gets ex-
pressed both in the process of drafting and through the
clean text as a collective achievement.
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The barometer of power (invisible to outsiders, and often
to participants in the process) is whether a country’s most
important text edits make it into the final version. Linguistic
skills are important. Negotiators who can achieve balanced
wording and possess a certain institutional memory to recall
previously “agreed language” that they can reapply to new
circumstances, are the most likely to embed their preferred
solutions in the final document. As a senior diplomat in the
Council secretariat explains:
If you are a competent negotiator, you are able to
propose something that can easily slide into a text.
You need to be textually economical with suggestions
for changes. I remember [Member State X’s] ambas-
sador [. . .] suggested to the Prime Minister to put a
comma in the text. We got the comma and it changed
the meaning completely and it meant that the Com-
mission couldn’t use the proposal for what they had
planned to use it. Sometimes a surgical, technical and
economical edit has a better chance than a compli-
cated suggestion. Also because the latter can raise all
kinds of questions from the others about what this
means. Drafting skills are crucial for how lucky you
are to get your proposals through. (Interview April 15,
2018)
Developing a strategy to subtly navigate one’s way through
the different iterations of the text is important. As Riles
(1999, 2006) points out, agency or politics do not disap-
pear; rather they emerge in the ways in which diplomats
manage amendments and procedures. Diplomats have to
strategize their edits and interventions, based on the affor-
dances particular technologies offer. Coalitions and negoti-
ations occur so fast that a parallel conversation to the one
at the negotiation table happens on the diplomats’ mobile
phones and along the outskirts of the room. Diplomats send
each other comments about how the meeting is developing,
and they strategize about who should speak first. Being able
to integrate the same textual revisions in the various fora
through which the text circulates—and to make sure that
one’s voice is heard and understood—also matters. At times
this may require that negotiators reiterate their points, as
an ambassador said during a Coreper meeting: “I have said
this before, but I am happy to repeat.” At other times, it
may require that an ambassador writes an edit of the text
out by hand and passes it on to the Mertens (the assistant
diplomat) who will photocopy and distribute the sheet to
all Coreper participants, so that they can see the suggested
revision in a hard copy in front of them.
Being able to fit into the collective track-change process
significantly bears on the result. Power is emergent in these
negotiations as it originates from specific social interac-
tions, and we cannot reduce it to the meeting of preexisting
national interests (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). How-
ever, as we have demonstrated in this article, how we use
technologies both enables and constrains this emergence.
Negotiations become a fluid maneuvering through textual
edits with an uncertain impact on the final outcome. Am-
bassadors typically find out whether they won or lost a par-
ticular edit, when they read a revised version of the text with
consolidated changes, but they do not always recall their
starting position. Power is highly situational, embedded in
the process of negotiations rather than clearly dispersed
between involved parties. Moreover, diplomats do not own
the text. Once they have negotiated it, lawyers will interpret
it, and this will not necessarily align with the intended mean-
ing that emerged from negotiations. As an ambassador said
to his foreign minister, “I would be curious to know who is
ruling this whole thing”—he meant the European Union.
Conclusion
The digital information and communication revolution has
turned everyday multilateral negotiations into a semivirtual
space of constant exchanges and proposed edits. Today,
a majority of multilateral negotiations takes place via the
computer screens, tablets, and mobile phones of diplomats,
whom distancemay separate, but who negotiate 24/7. Track-
change diplomacy—negotiating with the help of word pro-
cessing software, supported by email and digital devices—
has made the otherwise long and complicated process of
editing documents to reach international compromises,
quicker and more collaborative than ever.
But technological advances and the ubiquitous nature of
ICT domore than just facilitate negotiations. They also push
negotiations in a particular direction, sometimes with un-
expected consequences. To understand the role of track-
changes, and ICT more generally, we developed the notion
of affordance for international relations theory. Technolog-
ical affordances (i.e., the way a technology both enables and
constrains the tasks that users can possibly perform) lead
us away from the idea that we can deduce the effects of a
particular technology from its features. Instead, we can un-
derstand technology better by focusing on its enabling and
constraining power for particular international practices.
The methodological implications of this practice-oriented
approach are important. Rather than studying technology
in isolation, it is necessary to work inductively to analyze how
users employ technology in specific contexts. By turning our
attention to the technology in practice that scholars often
overlook, we can uncover how it shapes international nego-
tiations.
There are three main characteristics of track-change
diplomacy the particular affordances of ICT shape. Share-
ability denotes shared authorship; visualization means a par-
ticular schematized design aesthetics; and immediacy affords
high-speed text circulation. Together these characteristics
challenge established wisdom about diplomatic negotiations
in institutionalized multilateral settings in at least three
ways. Firstly, they affect how negotiators define national po-
sitions (as edits to the text more than as substantive po-
sitions originating from capital cities). Secondly, they im-
pact how diplomats reach compromises (through collective
drafting exercises by circulating snippets and track-changed
documents, involving more authors and less time for re-
flection). And thirdly, they shape what constitutes power
(the skillful use of language within specifically set design pa-
rameters, circumventing the diverging text edits to assert a
preferred meaning). As our analysis has shown, the track-
change function—originally intended by Microsoft Word
to help a group of coauthors keep track of their changes
in documents—may in fact lead to a loss of authorship
and control of the negotiation process, characterized by
its networked complexity. Track-change diplomacy can thus
provide an additional explanation for the occurrence of
pathologies in international organizations that might help
scholars to understand not only the outcomes of multilat-
eral negotiations, but also their everyday bureaucratic oper-
ations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
If international negotiations appear so strikingly differ-
ent through a technology-in-practice lens, the same is likely
the case for other phenomena in world politics, from in-
ternational conflicts mediated on social media such as Twit-
ter and Facebook, to nuclear deterrence and cyber security.
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Just as barbed wire changed the logics of war in a symbolic
and material sense (Barder 2016), digital technology shapes
world politics—and does so in ways that designers did not
necessarily intend. It is crucial that international relations
scholars analyze the technologies that are currently merg-
ing physical, digital, and biological worlds in the “Fourth
Industrial Revolution.” Central to this revolution are tech-
nological breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelli-
gence, robotics, the Internet of Things, and 3D printing,
which will undoubtedly have wide-ranging implications over
the coming years. However, international relations scholars
need to thinkmethodically about these technologies and an-
alyze the practices they afford, instead of focusing on their
abstract or idealized forms. This is the main value-adding
contribution we believe a practice perspective can offer a
study of technology in international relations.
Supplemental Information
The Online Ethnographic Methods Appendix, available
at https://www.diploface.ku.dk, https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/
people/view/330594-drieschova-alena and at the Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly data archive.
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